


**TOP SECRET**

25X1



24 October 1963



25X1

Copy No. 2

# CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN



25X1

DIA and DOS review(s) completed.

GROUP 1  
Excluded from automatic  
downgrading and  
declassification

**TOP SECRET**

25X1

Approved For Release 2003/01/29 : CIA-RDP79T00975A007300220001-6

Approved For Release 2003/01/29 : CIA-RDP79T00975A007300220001-6

24 October 1963

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

C O N T E N T S

25X1

3. Indonesia-Malaysia: Djakarta's subversive campaign against Malaysia is determined and flexible. (Page 4)

25X1

6. Congo: Civil servants began partial work stoppage on 23 October. (Page 7)
7. Dahomey: Riots of 22 October reflect dissatisfaction with economic and political situation. (Page 8)
8. Brazil: Goulart seeking to strengthen his weakened political position. (Page 9)
9. Bolivia: Government reform efforts in nationalized tin mines encounter strong local opposition. (Page 10)

25X1

25X1

Approved For Release 2003/01/29 : CIA-RDP79T00975A007300220001-6

Next 2 Page(s) In Document Exempt

Approved For Release 2003/01/29 : CIA-RDP79T00975A007300220001-6

Indonesia-Malaysia: (Indonesia's subversive campaign against Malaysia is both determined and flexible.)

25X1  
(All three major elements of the Indonesian power structure--the army, the Communist Party, and Sukarno himself--are cooperating and appear confident of ultimate success. At the same time, Sukarno and his chief civilian and military officials are aware of some major obstacles. Their appreciation of Britain's determination to defend Malaysia, at least for the present, has led them to avoid direct military confrontation in favor of long-range military and political subversion.)

(Indonesia is also aware that it is largely isolated on the Malaysia issue and that it is economically hard pressed as a result of suspension of Western aid and its own economic break with Singapore. Both Moscow and Peiping have made gestures of assistance in order to exploit this situation.)

25X1

25X1

Approved For Release 2003/01/29 : CIA-RDP79T00975A007300220001-6

Next 2 Page(s) In Document Exempt

Approved For Release 2003/01/29 : CIA-RDP79T00975A007300220001-6


Congo: A partial work stoppage by Congolese civil servants began on 23 October.

The civil servants are striking for a pay raise which has been under negotiation since last August. In addition, teachers in Leopoldville are still on strike for salary arrears, despite a government order to resume teaching. These and some other labor grievances seem legitimate, but the unions' objectives have become increasingly political. An interunion statement on 21 October again called for a new "government of public safety."

The government is fearful that labor agitation, plus a new surge of antigovernment plotting by leftist politicians, might result in disorders which the army could not or would not control. To meet the threat, a regime of quasi-martial law has been established under a three-man "emergency committee" headed by Minister of Defense Anany and backed by army chief General Mobutu.

The government is reported to be ready to give the civil servants a substantial pay raise, but Anany has made it clear he will deal harshly with "trouble-makers."

25X1



25X1

25X1



Dahomey: Rioting in the city of Porto Novo on 22 October appears to have been a symptom of widespread discontent over the economic and political situation rather than an organized effort to overthrow President Maga.

\*The riots followed the freeing, under parliamentary immunity, of a National Assembly deputy involved in a murder case. There are indications that National Assembly President Aplogan deliberately allowed the affair to get out of hand, presumably in order to embarrass Maga. On 23 October the assembly authorized prosecution of the deputy.

There have been reports of stepped-up organizational activity among the unions and of an increasing restiveness among the large numbers of unemployed in the area. [redacted] a labor demonstration has been planned to coincide with Maga's return to Dahomey today from an extensive foreign tour.

The Dahomean gendarmerie and army are believed to be capable of handling minor unrest. A serious disorder, however, would confront the French, who maintain a force of 700 men in Dahomey, with a problem like those they recently faced in the Congo (Brazzaville) and Chad. [redacted]

24 Oct 63

DAILY BRIEF

8

Brazil: President Goulart is taking measures to strengthen his badly weakened political position.

In the past few days, for example, Goulart has been talking with leaders of the moderate faction in his Brazilian Labor Party, apparently in hopes of obtaining their assistance in gaining the cooperation of other parties. Goulart is also anxious to regain support from the Social Democrats, many of whom have recently lost confidence in him.

This show of conciliation has given rise to speculation that Goulart may be shifting to a more centrist political stance. However, during the past week or so, Goulart has also proceeded with the investiture of extreme leftist General Assis Brasil as his chief military adviser, and has held lengthy discussions with pro-Communist Governor Miguel Arraes.

Until there is more convincing evidence, Goulart's actions can be interpreted as dictated essentially by short-run tactical considerations.

25X1

Bolivia: Government efforts to implement long-needed reforms in the country's nationalized tin mines continue to encounter entrenched local opposition.

Two Communist union leaders at the key mine of Catavi, Federico Escobar and Ireneo Pimentel, are refusing to go along with the agreement signed on 17 October between the national tin union leaders and the state mining corporation (Comibol). Government police are attempting to arrest them.

Despite this opposition, the government is moving forward with its program and has "retired" close to 400 surplus workers at Catavi. It plans to remove several hundred more in coming weeks.

The national union leaders are irritated at the delaying tactics of the Catavi agitators, and probably would not give support if the latter instigated another campaign of strikes at this time.

25X1

25X1

Approved For Release 2003/01/29 : CIA-RDP79T00975A007300220001-6

Next 1 Page(s) In Document Exempt

Approved For Release 2003/01/29 : CIA-RDP79T00975A007300220001-6

THE PRESIDENT

The Vice President

Executive Offices of the White House

Special Counsel to the President

The Special Assistant for National Security Affairs

The Scientific Adviser to the President

The Director of the Budget

The Director, National Aeronautics and Space Administration

The Department of State

The Secretary of State

The Under Secretary of State

The Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs

The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs

The Counselor and Chairman of the Policy Planning Council

The Director of Intelligence and Research

The Treasury Department

The Secretary of the Treasury

The Under Secretary of the Treasury

The Department of Defense

The Secretary of Defense

The Deputy Secretary of Defense

The Secretary of the Army

The Secretary of the Navy

The Secretary of the Air Force

The Assistant Secretary of Defense (International Security Affairs)

The Assistant Secretary of Defense

The Chairman, The Joint Chiefs of Staff

Chief of Naval Operations, United States Navy

Chief of Staff, United States Air Force

Chief of Staff, United States Army

Commandant, United States Marine Corps

U.S. Rep., Military Committee and Standing Group, NATO

Supreme Allied Commander, Europe

Commander in Chief, Pacific

Commander in Chief, Atlantic

The Director, Defense Intelligence Agency

The Director, The Joint Staff

The Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff

The Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of Army

The Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of Navy

The Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force

The Department of Justice

The Attorney General

The Federal Bureau of Investigation

The Director

The Atomic Energy Commission

The Chairman

The National Security Agency

The Director

The United States Information Agency

The Director

The National Indications Center

The Director

Approved For Release 2003/01/29 : CIA-RDP79T00975A007300220001-6

**TOP SECRET**

Approved For Release 2003/01/29 : CIA-RDP79T00975A007300220001-6

**TOP SECRET**